I have a junk coin that I never set a stop loss for, and then it was delisted by a major exchange, falling significantly. Now I've lost everything; there's no need for a stop loss anymore, just write it off.
Uniswap v2, to v3, to v4, there is an updated main line that modifies the transaction fees, especially in version V4 where a dynamic fee mechanism is introduced. After reading the hook mechanism of V4's dynamic fee, it can adjust transaction fees based on the changes in LP and prices. I am amazed at the innovation of DEX, it's really impressive.
Briefly describe the innovative iterations of fees in v2\v3\v4.
V2 has a fee of 0.3% for all pools, and the fees are directly converted into a part of the Lptoken.
V3 offers four types of fees: 0.01%, 0.05%, 0.3%, and 1%. The fees and PoS (the funding pool of v3 is called PoS, while v2 is called lptoken) are separate, meaning that the fees will not be automatically reinvested into PoS.
V4 theoretically provides an unlimited number of transaction fees, codifying and customizing the fee collection mechanism. In theory, fees can be used to adjust (encourage or suppress) trading behavior, and can also be used to adjust the impermanent loss of PoS.
Compared to cex, the trading fee mechanism has been very mature for quite some time, and it seems that there haven't been much changes for about ten years. The core is the user's VIP level and the fee payment with the platform coin.
From the innovation of transaction fees on Uniswap, I have a magical idea that CEX can also innovate on trading fees.
Delisting tokens is actually a lose-lose-lose situation, at least in the short term, as the project teams, Hodler users, and the exchange itself all incur losses.
If the exchange adopts different fees for different coins to replace delisting, is it a better mechanism?
For example, the exchange splits the trading fees for a trading pair (such as eth/usdt) into a basic fee and a punitive fee. The basic fee refers to the current exchange's fee policy.
The punitive fee is an innovative mechanism, defaulting to 0.
If a cex is dissatisfied with a certain coin, the current practice is to issue a notice of warning and then proceed with delisting. If there are punitive fees, a mechanism to impose additional punitive fees can be adopted to penalize this token.
And the penalty fee rate is adjustable, ranging from 0 to 10%. Haha, 100% means the transaction is confiscated, haha.
The punitive fee can also be set to be paid by the seller or the buyer, or even the seller paying the buyer, or vice versa, similar to the funding rate of perpetual contracts. This can adjust the incentive level for the buyer or the seller. Of course, by default it goes to the exchange.
Perhaps the punitive fees received by the exchange could also be used to establish an ecological development fund to support the development of this coin or sponsor the foundation to continue its efforts. But in this case, it should not be called punitive fees anymore; it should be renamed as ecological construction fees.
Many projects nowadays lack development funds, or in other words, the foundations of the coins are short on money.
For a long time, the foundations of cryptocurrency projects have been trying to find ways to receive extra coins from miners to serve as operational costs for the foundation. The most successful case is Dash, which takes 10% of the mining output as foundation income. LTC and BCH have both attempted to have miners sponsor developers, but they were unsuccessful.
Why not try to squeeze some money from trading users to sponsor development?
If the exchange could set a voluntary ecological construction fee for users, for example, for the btc-usdt trading pair, a default option could be set to off, and users could choose to contribute a small fee (0.001%?, 0.00000001%?) to be collected and directed to sponsor specific Bitcoin Core developers.
Of course, this makes it complicated.
Is expressing a warning and urging the project to improve through punitive fees on tokens better than a one-size-fits-all delisting?
The biggest problem is that trading users do not like trading friction; users will actively withdraw coins to exchanges with lower fees, but this is still better than delisting and not providing users with additional options.
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An idea: the exchange uses additional trading fees to replace delist.
I have a junk coin that I never set a stop loss for, and then it was delisted by a major exchange, falling significantly. Now I've lost everything; there's no need for a stop loss anymore, just write it off.
Uniswap v2, to v3, to v4, there is an updated main line that modifies the transaction fees, especially in version V4 where a dynamic fee mechanism is introduced. After reading the hook mechanism of V4's dynamic fee, it can adjust transaction fees based on the changes in LP and prices. I am amazed at the innovation of DEX, it's really impressive.
Briefly describe the innovative iterations of fees in v2\v3\v4.
V2 has a fee of 0.3% for all pools, and the fees are directly converted into a part of the Lptoken.
V3 offers four types of fees: 0.01%, 0.05%, 0.3%, and 1%. The fees and PoS (the funding pool of v3 is called PoS, while v2 is called lptoken) are separate, meaning that the fees will not be automatically reinvested into PoS.
V4 theoretically provides an unlimited number of transaction fees, codifying and customizing the fee collection mechanism. In theory, fees can be used to adjust (encourage or suppress) trading behavior, and can also be used to adjust the impermanent loss of PoS.
Compared to cex, the trading fee mechanism has been very mature for quite some time, and it seems that there haven't been much changes for about ten years. The core is the user's VIP level and the fee payment with the platform coin.
From the innovation of transaction fees on Uniswap, I have a magical idea that CEX can also innovate on trading fees.
Delisting tokens is actually a lose-lose-lose situation, at least in the short term, as the project teams, Hodler users, and the exchange itself all incur losses.
If the exchange adopts different fees for different coins to replace delisting, is it a better mechanism?
For example, the exchange splits the trading fees for a trading pair (such as eth/usdt) into a basic fee and a punitive fee. The basic fee refers to the current exchange's fee policy.
The punitive fee is an innovative mechanism, defaulting to 0.
If a cex is dissatisfied with a certain coin, the current practice is to issue a notice of warning and then proceed with delisting. If there are punitive fees, a mechanism to impose additional punitive fees can be adopted to penalize this token.
And the penalty fee rate is adjustable, ranging from 0 to 10%. Haha, 100% means the transaction is confiscated, haha.
The punitive fee can also be set to be paid by the seller or the buyer, or even the seller paying the buyer, or vice versa, similar to the funding rate of perpetual contracts. This can adjust the incentive level for the buyer or the seller. Of course, by default it goes to the exchange.
Perhaps the punitive fees received by the exchange could also be used to establish an ecological development fund to support the development of this coin or sponsor the foundation to continue its efforts. But in this case, it should not be called punitive fees anymore; it should be renamed as ecological construction fees.
Many projects nowadays lack development funds, or in other words, the foundations of the coins are short on money.
For a long time, the foundations of cryptocurrency projects have been trying to find ways to receive extra coins from miners to serve as operational costs for the foundation. The most successful case is Dash, which takes 10% of the mining output as foundation income. LTC and BCH have both attempted to have miners sponsor developers, but they were unsuccessful.
Why not try to squeeze some money from trading users to sponsor development?
If the exchange could set a voluntary ecological construction fee for users, for example, for the btc-usdt trading pair, a default option could be set to off, and users could choose to contribute a small fee (0.001%?, 0.00000001%?) to be collected and directed to sponsor specific Bitcoin Core developers.
Of course, this makes it complicated.
Is expressing a warning and urging the project to improve through punitive fees on tokens better than a one-size-fits-all delisting?
The biggest problem is that trading users do not like trading friction; users will actively withdraw coins to exchanges with lower fees, but this is still better than delisting and not providing users with additional options.
I feel that it is feasible.